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ContractGuard: Defend Ethereum Smart 
Contracts with Embedded Intrusion Detection 
Xinming Wang, Jiahao He, Zhijian Xie, Gansen Zhao, Shing-Chi Cheung 
Abstract— Ethereum smart contracts are programs that can be collectively executed by a network of mutually untrusted nodes. 
Smart contracts handle and transfer assets of values, offering strong incentives for malicious attacks. Intrusion attacks are a 
popular type of malicious attacks. In this paper, we propose ContractGuard, the first intrusion detection system (IDS) to defend 
Ethereum smart contracts against such attacks. Like IDSs for conventional programs, ContractGuard detects intrusion attempts 
as abnormal control flow. However, existing IDS techniques/tools are inapplicable to Ethereum smart contracts due to Ethereum’s 
decentralized nature and its highly restrictive execution environment. To address these issues, we design ContractGuard by 
embedding it in the contracts to profile context-tagged acyclic paths, and optimizing it under the Ethereum gas-oriented 
performance model. The main goal is to minimize the overheads, to which the users will be extremely sensitive since the cost 
needs to be paid upfront in digital concurrency. Empirical investigation using real-life contracts deployed in the Ethereum mainnet 
shows that on average, ContractGuard only adds to 36.14% of the deployment overhead and 28.27% of the runtime overhead. 
Furthermore, we conducted controlled experiments and show that ContractGuard successfully guard against attacks on all real-
world vulnerabilities and 83% of the seeded vulnerabilities. 
Index Terms—Blockchain, Ethereum Smart Contract, Intrusion Detection System, Anomaly Detection  
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1 INTRODUCTION
ockchains as one form of distributed ledger technology 
have gained considerable interest and adoption since 
Bitcoin [1] was introduced. Participants in a blockchain 
system collectively run a consensus protocol to maintain 
and secure a shared ledger of data. Blockchains were ini-
tially introduced for peer-to-peer payments, but more re-
cently, it has been extended to allow programmable trans-
actions in the form of smart contracts. Smart contracts are 
programs that can be collectively executed by a network of 
mutually untrusted nodes, which implement a consensus 
protocol that digitally enforce agreements among nodes: 
neither the nodes nor the creator of the smart contract can 
feasibly modify its code or subvert its execution.  
Because smart contracts are entrusted by the users to han-
dle and transfer assets of considerable value, they are subject 
to intensive hacking activities. Such hacking is more danger-
ous than that on a conventional network system, because 
once deployed on the blockchain, the contract becomes im-
mutable, essentially creating a high-risk paradigm: the de-
ployed code is nearly impossible to patch, and contracts col-
lectively control billions of USD worth of digital assets. There 
have been a plenty of well-documented attacks on the 
Ethereum smart contracts [3].  
In the literature, considerable research efforts have been 
spent on static analysis tools that detect vulnerabilities before 
deployment [4]–[11]. However, to the best of our knowledge, 
there is currently no security tools to protect smart contracts 
after deployment -- once being deployed on Ethereum, smart 
contract programs are completely exposed to the intruders. If 
the attack is accepted into the main chain, the loss will be irre-
versible. There is no second chance to fix the mistake. 
For conventional systems, administrators recognize that 
despite the developers’ best efforts to fix defects, vulnerabili-
ties are prevalent. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) [12] are 
commonly applied as a major means of protecting deployed 
systems from security attacks. By the way of how they detect 
intrusions, IDSs can be classified as signature-based or anom-
aly-based [12]. A typical anomaly-based IDS monitors dy-
namic program behavior against normal program behavior 
and raises an alert when detecting an anomaly. The normal 
behavior is learnt through training and profiling.  
In this work, our goal is to design a practical anomaly-
based IDS that can protect smart contracts after deployment. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the basic idea. When detecting abnormal be-
havior, the IDS will rollback all the changes to the contract 
states and raise an alarm to the administrators. This provides 
a chance to prevent the irreparable loss that the vulnerability 
can cause. For example, had the administrator of the DAO [13] 
applied IDS to protect their smart contracts, the famous DAO 
attack would have been prevented, because the attack trig-
gered an abnormal reentrant control flow not observed in in-
house testing. Similarly, the Parity Multisig Wallet incidence 
[14] could also have been prevented, because the attack trig-
gered a call of library code with an abnormal calling-context. 
Essentially, such an IDS can provide a second chance for the 
administrators to save the catastrophe. 
To put such an idea into practical work, however, we have 
to consider the unique characteristics of blockchain in general 
and Ethereum in particular. These characteristics make con-
ventional IDS techniques inapplicable to smart contracts: 
B 
———————————————— 
• X.M. Wang is with the Lakala Group, Building D1, Zhongguancun Yihao, 
Beiqing Road, Beijing, China. E-mail: wangxinming@lakala.com 
• J.H. He, Z.J. Xie, G.S. Zhao are with the School of Computer Science, 
South China Normal University, Zhongshan Road No. 55, Guangzhou, 
Guangdong, China. E-mail:{hejiahao, xiezhijian, gzhao}@m.scnu.edu.cn. 
• S.C. Cheung is with the Department of Computer Science and Engineer-
ing, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water 
Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong. E-mail: scc@cse.ust.hk 
• Corresponding authors:  Gansen Zhao; S.C. Cheung; 
2 MANUSCRIPT ID 
 
(1) As Ethereum is essentially a decentralized application 
platform [2], the smart contract programs are executed 
by mutually untrusted nodes across the whole world. 
Therefore, neither the conventional host-based nor 
network-based IDS techniques [12] are applicable. In-
stead, we must embed the IDS into the contracts, so 
that the protection procedure becomes part of the con-
sensus and none of the nodes can bypass them. 
(2) Ethereum smart contracts run in a highly restrictive 
environment called Ethereum virtual machine (EVM), 
which  lacks many capabilities that facilitate the im-
plementation of conventional IDSs, such as hardware 
registers [15] , call stack traversal [16], and event hooks 
[17]. Furthermore, EVM imposes a strict size limita-
tion of 24576 bytes on every contract. This requires a 
very careful design to minimize the size of embedded 
IDS implementation. 
(3) Ethereum introduces a fundamentally different per-
formance model. While the overheads of conventional 
IDSs are optimized toward reducing execution time, 
for Ethereum smart contracts the execution time is ir-
relevant. Instead, the overheads are determined by the 
gas cost [18]. This requires gas-oriented overhead opti-
mization that is different from those used in conven-
tional IDSs.  
In this paper, we propose ContractGuard as the first anom-
aly-based IDS to address the above challenges for Ethereum 
smart contracts. Compared with the signature-based ap-
proach, the anomaly-based approach has the advantage of 
not requiring the signatures of known vulnerabilities. Follow-
ing many existing anomaly-based IDSs [15], [19], [20], Con-
tractGuard monitors control flow path to classify execution 
behavior. The key idea is to combine the following two tech-
niques to meet the stringent requirements on the effectiveness 
and efficiency of IDS for smart contracts: 
(1) Context-tagged acyclic path profiling: Contract-
Guard uses the classic algorithm proposed by Ball and 
Larus [21] to index and profile intraprocedural acyclic 
path segments efficiently. Furthermore, to improve 
the effectiveness of anomaly detection, Contract-
Guard adds calling-context information to each in-
traprocedural path. As EVM does not provide the ca-
pability to traverse call stack directly, a profiling 
scheme is introduced to instrument calling-contexts.  
(2) Gas-efficient adaptive path set storage: As EVM 
heavily penalizes the use of persistent contract storage, 
conventional memory-based set implementations are 
highly gas-inefficient. Instead, ContractGuard adap-
tively selects one of the three data structures (embed-
ded list, embedded minimal perfect hash table [22], 
and built-in mapping). As a result, ContractGuard is 
able to achieve practical runtime and deployment gas 
overhead.  
Note that ContractGuard implements all the above tech-
niques on EVM binary code. Therefore, administrators can 
use it to protect Ethereum smart contracts without the need 
of their Solidity source code. 
To validate our approach, we conduct three sets of experi-
ments using real world Ethereum smart contracts. The first 
set of experiments concerns whether ContractGuard is prac-
tical in terms of gas overhead and false alarms.  We applied 
ContractGuard on the 8,314 contracts deployed on Ethereum 
mainnet up to block number 4,200,000, or the date Aug-24-
2017, with at least 100 transactions. The result show that the 
average deployment and runtime overhead of Contract-
Guard are 36.14% and 28.27%, respectively. The second set of 
experiment investigates the effectiveness of ContractGuard 
by applying it on six real-life smart contract programs with 
reported vulnerabilities. The result shows that Contract-
Guard successfully defend all of them. The third set of exper-
iments concerns the effectiveness using seeded vulnerabilities 
and real-life developer test cases for realistic training. Con-
tractGuard detect 83% of the seeded vulnerabilities. 
From a technical standpoint, this paper makes the follow-
ing contributions: 
1. We present a detailed study on whether attacks on 
smart contract vulnerabilities can be defended by de-
tecting abnormal control flow paths. 
2. We present the first empirical evidence that deploying 
IDS for Ethereum smart contracts is practical in term 
of deployment/runtime overhead and false alarms, 
using real world data from Ethereum mainnet. 
3. We propose ContractGuard as the first anomaly-
based IDS for Ethereum smart contracts. 
4. We demonstrate that ContractGuard scales to real life 
smart contract programs and it effectively defends 
both real-life and seeded vulnerabilities.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 in-
troduces the background on the smart contract program 
model and the context-tagged acyclic path. Section 3 gives de-
tails and insights into motivation of ContractGuard.  Section 
4 presents the design of ContractGuard. Section 5 reports the 
result of simulation experiments, Section 6 reports the exper-
iment results. After discussing the related work (Section 7), 
we close with the conclusions (Section 8).  
2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Ethereum Smart Contract Program Model 
As shown in Fig. 2, an Ethereum smart contract program 
is composed of one or more contract accounts that are de-
ployed instances of contract code, and one or more user ac-
counts that hold ethers as the cryptocurrency. The users rely 
on clients to interact with the Ethereum network, which is 
maintained by a group of miners that pack transactions into 
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Fig. 1. The idea of IDS for smart contracts. 
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the blockchain.  
Program structure: Smart contracts are mostly written in 
Solidity [23], which is a JavaScript-like, but typed, program-
ming language. At the source level, contracts written in Solid-
ity are analogous to classes in object-oriented languages. Con-
tracts can contain declarations of state variables, definitions of 
functions, modifiers, and constructors. Functions support en-
capsulation (visibility attributes). To enable deployment on 
the Ethereum platform, developers compile the contract 
source code into EVM binary code. A piece of code called 
function selector is added as an entry point of the contract. 
Whenever a function is called, the contract starts executing at 
the function selector. The selector decodes the message and 
jumps into an appropriate function. Ethereum smart con-
tracts allow customizing the handling of messages that do not 
specify a concrete calling function through the fallback function.  
Invocation model: After deployment, contract accounts 
can be invoked with its external/public functions in three dif-
ferent ways. The first way is by the client sending a message 
call transaction, which makes a message call that contains the 
signature hash of the target function and parameter data. A 
message call transaction must be signed, broadcasted, and 
packed to take effect. It is a write-operation that can change 
the account balances and the contract states. Miners charge 
the sender with ethers to pay for the gas costed by the trans-
action. The second way is by another contract account directly 
making a message call to invoke a function. This action can 
always trace transitively back to a message call transaction. 
Finally, the third way is by the client locally calling view/pure 
functions, which never modify the state and does not cost gas.  
Data management model: The EVM is a 256-bit word 
stack-based machine. Contracts can access four kinds of data: 
the operation stack with a maximum size of 1024, a word-ad-
dressed byte array called memory to serve as volatile storage, 
a word-addressed word array called storage to serve as persis-
tent storage, and a read-only word array calldata as a copy of 
message call input data. The contents of stack, memory, and 
calldata are not persisted at the end of transactions, nor are 
they accessible across the boundary of message calls.  
2.2 Context-tagged Acyclic Path 
ContractGuard protects smart contracts by monitoring 
context-tagged acyclic path, which is extended from the in-
tra-procedural acyclic path defined by Ball and Laurus [21]. 
A context-tagged acyclic path is a tuple p, c, where p is an 
intra-procedural acyclic path and c is the calling-context. 
Informally, intra-procedural acyclic path is a path on the 
acyclic version of control flow graph (CFG). This acyclic 
version is obtained by replacing every backedge w  v 
with two surrogate edges entry  v and w  exit. For ex-
ample, consider the CFG in Fig. 3 (a). The two backedges 3 
 1 and 4  3 are replaced by surrogate edges entryc  3, 
entryc  4, 3  exitc and 4  exitc in Fig. 3 (b).  
Intra-procedural acyclic path has two interesting proper-
ties that make it particularly suitable to the task of anomaly 
detection. Firstly, the numbers of intra-procedural acyclic 
paths are always limited, as the acyclic CFG does not have cy-
cles. This is important to the efficient storage of path set. Sec-
ondly, a full path in the original CFG can be broken into sev-
eral acyclic paths at the backedges. For example, the path en-
tryc12343434315exitc in Fig. 3 (a) 
can be broken into p1: entryc1234exitc, p2: entryc3 
4exitc, p3: entryc34exitc, p4: entryc3exitc, and p5: 
entryc15exitc.  Intuitively, acyclic paths correspond to 
the path segments before, inside or after a loop. Full paths 
with different numbers of loop iterations can share the same 
set of acyclic paths. The loop-insensitivity can be important to 
the reduction of the false alarms. 
Given the call graph with functions as nodes and callsites 
as edges, the calling context of a function f is defined as the 
sequence of call sites pending on entry to f [24].  Due to recur-
sion, the call graph may contain cycles. In the same way as a 
backedge is replaced by a subrogate edge in a CFG, each re-
cursive callsite is replaced by a subrogate callsite from the 
program entry to the function that is called recursively. For 
example, the call graph of the contract in Fig. 3 (c) is trans-
formed to that in Fig. 3 (d). As a result, there are four calling-
contexts of C: sa1c1, sa1c2, sb1c3, and b*c3. 
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Fig. 2. Ethereum Smart contract program model. 
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Fig. 3. Examples of Context-tagged Acyclic Path. 
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In order to capture more behavior, ContractGuard extends 
intra-procedural acyclic paths by profiling additional virtual 
branches that do not exist in the code. These virtual branches 
check the potential pre-/post- conditions of each instruction. 
Specifically, for each arithmetic operation, we check the pre-
condition that there is no over-/under-flow. For each function 
call, we check the post-condition whether the return value is 
null (if the return type is address), false (if the return type is 
Boolean), or zero (if the return type is int). 
3 MOTIVATION 
In this section, we present the empirical investigation re-
sults that motivate ContractGuard.  
The key hypothesis in ContractGuard is that one can dif-
ferentiate vulnerability-attacking transactions from normal 
transactions by comparing their control flow behaviors, as the 
formers tend to be associated with abnormal control flow paths, 
that is, paths that never occur in the training transactions 
(which we assume to be correct). While there is literature [12], 
[16] supporting this hypothesis for conventional programs, its 
validity for Ethereum smart contracts has yet been validated. 
In order to validate this hypothesis, we refer to several recent 
empirical studies on Ethereum smart contract vulnerabilities 
([3], [6], [11], [25]–[27]). In total, we analyze 11 major vulnera-
bilities and investigate whether attacks on them trigger ab-
normal control flow paths. 
1. Reentrancy [12]: When an innocent contract calls or 
sends ether to an external contract, the external calls can be 
hijacked by attackers, whereby forcing the contract to further 
execute an additional piece of code, such as calling back to the 
innocent contract itself. If the innocent contract does not ex-
pect reentrancy and implement the correct checking, then it is 
susceptible to illegal contract state changes. Attacks of this 
kind were used in the infamous DAO hack [13]. 
Depending on whether the re-entered function is the same 
as the function that makes the external call, the vulnerability 
can be classified as same-function reentrancy or cross-func-
tion reentrancy [6]. The following piece of code shows an ex-
ample of same-function reentrancy. At line 6, the innocent 
contract makes an external call to the attacker contract. As no 
function name is specified, EVM will invoke the fallback func-
tion (line 12), in which withdraw is reentered and make ille-
gal state changes.   
1:     contract InnocentContract { 
2:             mapping(address => uint)private balances; 
3:     function withdraw(){ 
4:                  uint amount = balances[msg.sender]; 
5:                  if(amount > 0){ 
6:                         msg.sender.call(balances[msg.sender]); 
7:                         balances[msg.sender] = 0; 
8:                  } 
9:           }               
10:   } 
11:    contract AttackerContract {  
12:       function (){ 
13:            Wallet wallet = msg.sender; 
14:             wallet.withdraw()   
15:         } 
16:    }    
Abnormal control flow: Yes. Both the same-function and 
the cross-function reentrancy will trigger an abnormal control 
flow path that reenters the innocent contract. Had the training 
transactions contained such control flow, the developers 
would already recognize the problem and fix the defect. Note 
that the detection requires calling-context information. This is 
a reason why ContractGuard profiles calling-contexts. 
2. Dangerous delegatecall [11]: When a contract uses 
delegatecall() to call an external function, the function 
will be executed in the context of the calling contract. This fea-
ture enables the implementation of shared libraries. However, 
it could induce vulnerabilities when some library functions 
run in an unexpected context and make illegal state changes.   
The following piece of code illustrates a simplified version 
of the vulnerability that cause the Parity Multisig Wallet inci-
dence [14]. At line 11, the innocent contract uses delegate-
call () to call a library function selected by the signature hash 
encoded in the message call input data. At line 15, the attacker 
triggers line 11 to call function init, which is executed in the 
context of InnocentContract and therefore transfers the 
ownership of InnocentContract to the attacker. 
1:     contract DelegateLibrary { 
2:    address public owner; 
3:          function init(){  
4:                   owner = msg.sender; 
5:          } 
6:   } 
7:    contract InnocentContract {  
8:          address public owner; 
9:          DelegateLibrary _library; 
10:    function (){ 
11:            _library.delegatecall(msg.data); 
12:      } 
13:  } 
14:   contract AttackerContract { 
15:          … innocent.call( 
16:          bytes4(keccak256("init()"))); ... 
Abnormal control flow: Yes. The attack of this vulnerabil-
ity triggers an abnormal control flow path in which some li-
brary functions like init is called unexpectedly through 
delegatecall. As these library functions are never in-
tended to be called in this way, the training transactions will 
never cover this abnormal control flow path.  
3. Arithmetic Over/Under Flows [3]: In arithmetic opera-
tions, an over/under flow occurs when an operation is per-
formed that requires a fixed size variable to store a number  
(e.g. uint256) that is outside the range of the variable's data 
type (e.g. uint8). In April 2018, malicious attackers utilized 
an integer overflow on multiplication to attack BECToken, 
causing the token price to drop to nearly zero [28]. 
Abnormal control flow: Yes. The extended paths intro-
duced in Section 2.2 contain virtual branches that check all po-
tential pre-conditions, and under-/over- flow absence is one 
of them. As we assume that the training transactions are cor-
rect, they should not cover paths that trigger under-/over- 
flow conditions.  
4. Default Visibilities [26]: In Solidity contracts, the func-
tion visibility specifiers are default to public, allowing other 
contracts or users to call the functions externally. Therefore, 
devastating vulnerabilities may arise when the developers 
forget to write visibility specifiers for functions that should 
not be exposed to external calls.  
Abnormal control flow: Yes. An abnormal control flow 
can be detected when the internal function for which devel-
opers forget to specify the visibility is called externally. The 
training transactions will never contain such a call, as these 
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functions are internal in the mind of the developers from 
whom the training transactions are obtained. 
5. Superficial randomness [26]: Contracts that make deci-
sion by using Ethereum state variables such as block 
timestamp as random seeds are subject to attacks, as these 
variables can all be manipulated by the miners.  
Abnormal control flow: None. This vulnerability is essen-
tially about misuses of variables. It is irrelevant to the control 
flow paths of the contracts.  
6. Unchecked send [6]: When the contract performs a 
failed external call,  the transaction that will normally revert. 
However, if the external call is made through low-level call 
() or send () API, they will return false instead of rolling back 
the transaction. A common pitfall arises when the return 
value of call () or send () is not checked. For example, in the 
following piece of code, the developers expect the transaction 
will revert when the external call at line 2 fails. However, 
when line 2 fails, the transaction will simply carry on and ex-
ecute line 3, resulting in an inconsistent contract state. 
1:     if (gameHasEnded && !prizePaidOut){ 
2:          winner.send(1000); 
3:    PrizePaidOut = True; 
4:   } 
Abnormal control flow: Yes. The extended paths intro-
duced in Section 2.2 contain virtual branches that check all po-
tential post-conditions, and the truth-value returned by any 
function is one of them. As we assume the training transac-
tions to be correct, they should not cover paths that make 
call ()/send () fail. 
7. Order Dependence [6]: It is also known as race condi-
tion [26]. The attack on this vulnerability occurs when a miner 
tries to “race” with a smart contract participant by inserting 
their own transaction before the victim’s transaction in the 
block and making changes to the related contracts. Such 
changes might potentially invalidate the  
Abnormal control flow: None. Attacks on this vulnerabil-
ity target the execution environment of the contracts. There 
are no abnormal control flow paths to detect. 
8. Tx.Origin Authentication [26]: Contracts that authenti-
cate users using the tx.origin variable are typically vulner-
able to phishing attacks which can trick users into performing 
authenticated actions on the vulnerable contract. For example, 
consider the following piece of code. The innocent contract 
uses the checking at line 3 to ensure that only its owner can 
transfer the asset. However, the attacker can trick the owner 
into sending ether to the attacker contract at line 8. This in-
vokes the fallback function at line 9 and call transfer with 
tx.origin as the owner who is the one that initiates the 
transaction. Therefore, the authentication at line 3 will pass 
and the attacker steals the asset.  
1:     contract InnocentContract { 
2:    function transfer(address dest, uint amount){ 
3:                 if (tx.origin != owner) throw; 
4:                        dest.send(amount); 
5:                } 
6:          }               
7:   } 
8:    contract AttackerContract {  
9:      function (){ 
10:           Wallet w = Wallet(walletAddr) 
11:            w.transfer(thiefAddr, msg.sender.balance); 
12:      } 
13:  }    
Abnormal control flow: Yes. In order for this attack to suc-
ceed, the attacker must trigger a transaction that initiates from 
the calling of the attacker’s contract by the owner, and then 
calls back to the function with the tx.origin checking. By 
contrast, the training transaction will only call the function 
with tx.origin checking directly.  
9. Denial Of Service [26]: This category is very broad, but 
fundamentally consists of attacks where users can leave the 
contract inoperable for a small period of time, or in some cases 
permanently. 
Abnormal control flow: Yes. Apparently, the control flow 
path that leaves the contract inoperable is abnormal, as none 
of the training transactions will try to block the contracts from 
providing services. 
10. Short address [26]: When the parameters passed to a 
smart contract are shorter than the expected parameter length,  
the EVM will pad 0's to the end of the encoded parameters. If 
a third party application does not validate inputs, it will be 
vulnerable to attacks that exploit this feature. 
Abnormal control flow: None. The target of attacks on this 
vulnerability is not the contracts themselves, but the third 
party applications that interact with the contracts. Therefore, 
there are no abnormal control flow paths. 
11. Logic error [6]: Complex predicates are prone to vari-
ous logic-related defects such as wrong relational/logic oper-
ators and misplaced parentheses. Some of these detects can 
cause subtle vulnerabilities in the contracts. 
Abnormal control flow: No always exist. If there are no 
overlaps between paths that trigger the failure-inducing con-
dition of the defect and paths that do not, then abnormal con-
trol flow paths can be detected from the attacking transactions. 
However, it is well known that because of coincidental correct-
ness [29], this requirement is not always met. Therefore, ab-
normal control flow paths do not always exist for attacks on 
TABLE 1 
ABNORMAL CONTROL FLOW OF VULNERABILITIES 
Vulnerability Abnormal control flow 
1. Reentrancy Yes. The path that re-enters the caller 
function that makes external call. 
2. Dangerous delegate call  Yes. The path that calls an unexpected 
library function through delegatecall 
3. Arithmetic Over/Under 
Flows 
Yes. The extended path in which over-
/under- flow condition checking vir-
tual branch returns true. 
4. Default visibilities  Yes. The path that has an external call 
to the internal function for which de-
velopers forget to specify the visibility. 
5.  Superficial randomness  None 
6. Unchecked send Yes. The extended path in which the 
checking of the return value of call 
() or send () gets false. 
7. Order Dependence None 
8. Tx.Origin Authentication Yes. The path that initiates from the 
calling of the attacker’s contract by the 
owner, and then calls back to the func-
tion with the tx.origin checking 
9. Denial Of Service Yes. The path that leaves the contract 
inoperable. 
10. Short Address None 
11. Logic error Not always exist. Depends on 
whether coincidental correctness oc-
curs in the training transactions. 
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this vulnerability. 
TABLE 1 summarizes the result. As we can see, the attacks 
on a majority of the vulnerabilities are associated with abnor-
mal control flow paths. This provides initial evidence that 
control flow anomaly based IDS can be effective at defending 
the smart contracts. For the remaining vulnerabilities, the di-
rect attack target is not the contracts themselves: it is either the 
Ethereum execution environment (#5. Superficial random-
ness and #7. Order Dependence), or the third-party applica-
tions that interact with the contracts (#10. Short address). 
4 THE APPROACH OF CONTRACTGUARD 
4.1 Overview 
Figure 4 shows the overall approach of ContractGuard, 
which consists of three phases. 
In the training phase, we deploy the protected smart con-
tract program without instrumentation on the test environ-
ment of Ethereum. There can be three choices: a private net-
work, the Ropsten test network, or the simulator Ganache [30]. 
The last choice is preferred as it provides a clean environment 
and quick transaction processing speed. Next, we send the 
training transactions to the deployed contract instances. 
These training transactions usually come from the passed test 
cases provided by the developers. After executing each test 
case, we collect all execution traces, and then extract the cov-
ered context-tagged acyclic paths. We use these paths as the 
initial safe path set. As the membership checking on the initial 
set will be cheaper than that on the set of paths appended after 
deployment, we recommend developers to provide as many 
passed test cases as possible. 
In the protecting phase, we instrument the binary code of 
the protected contracts with the implementation of context-
tagged acyclic path profiling and the safe path set member-
ship checking. The administrators then deploy the instru-
mented code on the Ethereum mainnet. After deployment, 
ContractGuard profiles the context-tagged acyclic paths for 
every transaction sent to the protected contracts and test their 
membership in the safe path set. If ContractGuard finds at 
least one abnormal path, it will roll back the state changes 
done by the transaction and raise an alarm.  
In the alarm-verifying phase, the administrators receive 
alarm notification by monitoring the Ethereum mainnet 
transaction logs. They then review each rejected transaction 
by replaying it in the test environment forked from the block-
chain state right before the contract receives this transaction. 
If this transaction is confirmed as legitimate, then the admin-
istrators will send an administration transaction to the pro-
tected contract and append the context-tagged acyclic paths 
covered in this transaction into the safe path set.  
 
4.2 Protection Boundary of ContractGuard 
Under the Ethereum smart contract program model (Sec-
tion 2.1), there can be three different scenarios that the trig-
ger IDS protection, as illustrated in Fig. 5.  
In the setting of Fig. 5, the smart contract program that the 
administrator want to protect contains two contracts. Their 
deployed instances are A and B, respectively. ContractGuard 
instruments both of them. At the runtime, these two contract 
instances might interact with each other or with another un-
protected contract instance C through message calls.   
In the first scenario, the transaction starts with a call to a 
public/external function (referred to as the transaction entry 
function) of a contract within the boundary and never makes 
calls to unprotected contracts outside the boundary. In this 
scenario, ContractGuard will profile the paths for all func-
tions in all protected contracts. When the protected contracts 
call each other, we insert the current calling-context infor-
mation inside the message call data, so that the full calling-
context can be established. Whenever a context-tagged acyclic 
path ends, ContractGuard checks its membership in the safe 
path set. If it is not found, ContractGuard will set an anomaly 
flag. This flag will be cascadingly passed with the message 
call return data toward the transaction entry function. Before 
the transaction entry function returns, if ContractGuard finds 
the anomaly flag is set, it will raise an alarm and execute RE-
VERT, whose semantics dictate that all the changes made in 
the current transaction are rolled back [18].  
In the second scenario, the transaction starts with a call to 
a protected contract. During execution, the transaction calls 
unprotected contracts, which in turn might call back to the 
protected contracts. For example, in Fig. 5, the entry function 
in A calls a function in C, which in turn calls a function in B. 
In this scenario, ContractGuard will profile the paths in both 
A and B. However, A and B will independently check the 
anomaly flag and execute REVERT when the anomaly flag is 
set. This results in two different outcomes depending on 
where the alarm is raised. If the alarm is raised in B, then only 
the changes made in B are rolled back. If the alarm is raised in 
A, then all the changes made in A, B, and C are all rolled back. 
We note that ideally, we shall have a consistent treatment for 
both cases. However, in order to achieve this, protected con-
tracts have to explicitly synchronize the anomaly flag with 
each other by making extra message calls and expensive con-
tract storage writings, because unprotected contracts are not 
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Fig. 4. The overview of ContractGuard. 
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controlled by ContractGuard. This synchronization will make 
the runtime overhead too high. Therefore, we make this de-
sign trade-off by not passing the anomaly flag across calls to 
unprotected contracts.  
For a similar reason, when a protected contract X calls an 
unprotected contract Z, ContractGuard does not pass the cur-
rent calling-context to another protected contract Y that is 
transitively called by Z.  One exception, though, is when X 
and Y are the same. In this case, ContractGuard passes the 
current calling-context by writing to a contract storage varia-
ble before calling the unprotected contract. We choose to im-
plement this step because it is essential to the detection of 
reentrancy attacks. A drawback of this is the introduction of 
an extra 5000 gas per external call. As we shall see in Section 
6.4, this is in fact the single most costly factor that affects the 
runtime overhead.  
In the final scenario, the transaction starts with a call to an 
unprotected contract, which then calls the protected contracts. 
The following treatment, however, is essentially the same 
with those in the first two scenarios.  
4.3 Intra-procedural Path Indexing and Profiling 
ContractGuard adapts the EPP algorithm proposed by Ball 
and Larus [21] to index and profile intra-procedural path. 
It applies the adapted algorithm to each acyclic control 
flow graph (CFG), where backedges in the normal CFG are 
replaced by surrogate edges. We have introduced this 
treatment in Section 2.2. 
Figure 6 gives the adapted EPP algorithm with an example. 
The core idea is to label the acyclic CFG with two quantities. 
For a vertex v, it is labeled with NumPaths (v) as the number 
of paths from v to exit vertex. For example, the vertex D in Fig. 
6 has two paths to the exit vertex F: DF and DEF, there-
fore it is labelled with 2. Next, let e1, e2… en be all the edges that 
starts with the same vertex v. Then edge e1 is labelled with 
zero and the remaining ei is labelled with: 
𝑉𝑎𝑙(𝑒𝑖) =∑𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠(𝑒𝑛𝑑_𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑥(𝑒𝑗))
𝑗<𝑖
 
With this labeling scheme, it can be proven (Theorem 1 in  
[21]) that for a vertex v, each path p from v to the exit vertex 
will be assigned with a unique number in the range 0, 1, … 
NumPaths (v)-1 by summing up Val(e) for edges in p. Besides, 
it can be shown that the algorithm in Fig. 6 will generate the 
correct label for every vertex and edge.  
After EPP labeling, we now have an efficient method to 
profile the acyclic intraprocedural path: At each function en-
try, we allocate an integer local variable epp with initial value 
0. Next, whenever the control flow passes through an edge e, 
we add Val (e) to epp if Val (e) is not 0. At the function exit, 
we generate the covered path indexed by the value of epp. 
Besides, at the backedge, we also generate an acyclic path in-
dexed by the value of epp. The variable epp is then reset with 
0 to start a new acyclic path. 
The result of the algorithm can be further optimized by re-
arranging the edge value assignment to minimize the number 
of non-zero edge values [31]. We adopt this optimization in 
ContractGuard.  
4.4  Calling-context Indexing and Profiling 
Besides intraprocedural paths, ContractGuard also needs 
calling-context information. Inspired by the EPP algorithm, 
we develop an efficient calling-context indexing and pro-
filing algorithm, as shown in Fig. 7. 
Our proposed algorithm works on the acyclic call graph, 
which is obtained by replacing the recursive function call 
with surrogate-edges (Section 2.2).  Each callsite in the pro-
gram is represented by a call edge and a return edge.  
In essence, our algorithm is the “reverse” version of EPP 
algorithm applied on the call graph. Our algorithm also 
works by labeling the vertices and edges. However, instead 
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foreach vertex v in reverse 
topological order of flow edge 
     if v is a leaf vertex 
             NumPaths (v) = 1 
   else 
             NumPaths (v) = 0 
foreach edge e: vw 
            Val (e) = NumPaths (v) 
            NumPaths(v) =  
NumPaths(v)+ 
NumPaths(w) 
(a) example CFG (b) Algorithm 1: EPP [21] 
Fig. 6. Efficient intra-procedural path indexing and profiling. 
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of following the reverse topological order, our algorithm 
follows the topological order. The objective is to label each 
vertex f with NumCCs (f) as the number of all calling-contexts 
of f. This NumCCs (f) can also be interpreted as the number of 
call-edge paths from the program entry to f. Next, let c1, c2… 
cn be all the call edges that ends with the same vertex f, and r1, 
r2… rn are the corresponding return edges. Then edge c1 is la-
belled with zero and the remaining ci is labelled with: 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑙(𝑐𝑖) =∑𝑁𝑢𝑚𝐶𝐶𝑠(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑥(𝑐𝑗))
𝑗<𝑖
 
, and ri =  ci for i in 1 …n.  
Like EPP, we can prove that for a vertex f, every calling 
context of f will be assigned with a unique number in the 
range 0, 1 … NumCCs (f)-1 by summing up Val(c) for every 
call edge c in the calling context. This proof is similar to that 
for Theorem 1 in [21]. We omit it for the sake of brevity. 
To implement the calling-context profiling, we allocate a 
global variable ctx with initial value 0 at the program entry. 
At each call-site, we add Val (e) to ctx before the function call, 
then add Val (d) to ctx after the function return.  At each 
function entry, the value of ctx then uniquely represents the 
current calling context.  
4.5 Gas-efficient Adaptive Path Set Storage 
ContractGuard combines the above two indexing schemes 
to create a compact indexing scheme for context-tagged 
acyclic path: for each function f with an entry node e, its 
context-tagged acyclic paths are consecutively indexed by 
0, 1, 2 … NumPaths (e)*NumCCs (f)-1. At runtime, when-
ever an intraprocedural acyclic path terminates, we can ob-
tain the index of the context-tagged acyclic path as 
ctx*NumPaths (e) + epp. 
With this compact indexing scheme, the problem of safe 
path set membership test can be formulated as follows: given 
an integer k[0, n), how to check whether k is in a set S of m 
integer p1, p2 …pm [0, n)? While this is a fundamental prob-
lem and there are many solutions, under the special gas cost 
model of EVM, three of them seem to make sense: 
⚫ Embedded list: This solution embeds S into the code 
as a series of constant comparison.  
⚫ Embedded minimal perfect hash table (MPHT): 
This solution embeds S as a MPHT into the code. 
ContractGuard uses the CHD algorithm [22]. The 
idea of CHD is to use two levels of hashing to con-
struct the hash table. The first level uses a hash func-
tion G to group elements in S into different buckets, 
and each buckets use a different second-level func-
tion to hash the value.  
⚫ Built-in mapping in contract storage: This solution 
uses the built-in mapping type of Solidity to store the 
set S in the contract storage. 
Figure 8 shows the performance comparison between 
these three solutions based on their implementation in Con-
tractGuard. In term of deployment cost, all three solutions are 
linear to the size of path set. However, using built-in mapping 
is particularly expensive. This is because adding a path in-
volves one SSET to write contract storage, which costs 20000 
gas. By contrast, adding a path for the first two solutions in-
volve several extra instructions, which only cost 200 gas per 
byte. In term of membership test gas cost, both embedded 
MPHT and built-in mapping require constant gas, while em-
bedded list requires linear gas. However, embedded list costs 
the least gas when the set size is lower than six. 
From the above analysis, we design the adaptive path set 
storage as follows. For the initial safe path set obtained during 
the training phase, ContractGuard instruments it either as an 
embedded list when the size is lower than six, or as an em-
bedded MPHT otherwise. Built-in mapping is usually not 
used to implement the initial safe path set. However, it is al-
ways used to store the additional path appended by the ad-
ministrators dynamically after deployment.  
5 SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS ON THE MAINNET 
To evaluate the efficiency of ContractGuard, we conduct 
simulation experiments concerning whether embedding 
the IDS into smart contracts is practical in term of overhead 
(Section 5.1), and whether there are too many false alarms 
for the IDS to be useful (Section 5.2). 
5.1 Is the Overhead of ContractGuard Practical? 
Protecting a smart contract program with an embedded in-
trusion detector in general and ContractGuard in particu-
lar involves two kinds of overhead, both of which cost ex-
tra ether cryptocurrency:  
1) Deployment overhead: The contract code expands in 
size after instrumentation with the anomaly detection 
functionalities and the initial safe path set. Therefore, 
Ethereum will charge additional gas at the contract 
A
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foreach function f in topological 
order of call edge 
      if f is a root vertex 
             NumCCs (f) = 1 
else 
             NumCCs (f) = 0 
foreach pair of call edge c:  
xf and return edge r: fx 
              Val (c) =  NumCCs (f) 
              Val (r) = - NumCCs (f) 
              NumCCs(f) =  
NumCCs (x) + 
NumCCs (f) 
(a) example call graph 
(b) Algorithm 2: calling-context in-
dexing and profiling  
Fig. 7. Efficient calling-context indexing and profiling. 
 
      Runtime overhead                      Deployment overhead 
Fig. 8. Overhead trade-off of different path set storage solutions. 
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creation, adding to the deployment cost. 
2) Runtime overhead: During transaction execution, the 
embedded IDS profiles the control flow paths. Besides, 
when a path terminates, the IDS needs to check its 
membership in the path set. Both operations add to 
the gas cost of the transaction.  
While only the administrators pay for the first overhead, 
all users that send transactions to the protected contracts pay 
for the second overhead. Had either overhead been too high, 
the contract administrator would not use the IDS, even if it 
can effectively protect their contracts.  
In order to investigate the overhead of deploying Contract-
Guard for contracts in the real world, we ran the latest version 
of Geth (1.9.0) in full archive mode (which retrains all histori-
cal information) and synchronized with Ethereum mainnet 
up to block number 4,200,000 (reached at the date Aug-24-
2017). In total, there is 341,585 contract accounts. Among them, 
332,008 contract accounts have few than 100 transactions, an-
other 1,173 ones make the control flow graph extraction tool 
crashed (we use Vandal [7] in our experiments). We chose the 
remaining 8,314 contract accounts as the subjects for investi-
gation, as they likely represent contracts of real use. In total, 
users sent 19,944,547 transactions to these contracts during 
the period. We compare the code passed as input data of the 
contract creation transactions of these 8,314 instances, and 
found 985 contract accounts are distinctive. The others are 
clones of them. In the following, we will report the average 
for both the complete 8,314 and the distinctive 985. 
We apply ContractGuard to all the subject contract ac-
counts. Since the cost of deploying contracts is proportional 
to the binary code size (200 gas per byte [18]), we measure the 
deployment overhead as (instrumented code size) / (original 
code size) - 100%. We set the safe path set of each contract con-
tains all the context-tagged acyclic paths covered by all the 
transactions sent to this contract. This treatment simulates the 
worst case of deployment overhead.  
Figure 9 (a) shows the deployment overhead for all, the 
largest 20%, and the smallest 20% contracts in term of their 
original size. The average deployment overhead is 24.07% for 
the largest 20% contracts and 51.84% for the smallest 20% con-
tracts. Overall, the average deployment overhead is 36.14% 
for all the 8,314 contract instances and 37.76% for the 985 dis-
tinctive ones. The contracts with top-5 worst deployment 
overheads are shown in Fig. 9 (b).  
The result in Fig. 9 provides initial evidence that the de-
ployment overheads of IDS for smart contracts can be practi-
cal: essentially, the administrator is paying 36.14% more gas 
in exchange for more security for their contracts. Note that 
none of the 8,314 contract accounts exceeds the 24576-bytes 
limit after ContractGuard instruments them. 
Next, we investigate the runtime overhead. For all the 
19,944,547 transactions sent to the subject contracts, we collect 
their detailed execution traces. We then align each trace with 
the code instrumented by ContractGuard, and make up the 
instructions that the transaction would have executed had 
ContractGuard been embedded into the contract. In this way, 
we obtain the precise runtime overhead of ContractGuard on 
each transaction by accumulating the extra gas cost spent on 
executing the extra instructions.  
 
# 
Contract Address on 
Ethereum mainnet 
Original  
code size 
Deployment 
overhead 
1 0x5bde2f1f37f594fd610b17
31284f5a204e3ea545 4295 61.23% 
2 0x80aa81029df9afdc70a621
c86d7a81d7e9ed7e3a 5899 59.83% 
3 0x051fda7486480dd5abcf5
dd742ef002a2ebb9ea0 7703 59.75% 
4 0xc723d744dd32780c6f5cef
4705e99919e77879d7 6273 59.06% 
5 0x5c543e7ae0a1104f78406c
340e9c64fd9fce5170 2650 58.47% 
(a) Distribution of the Deployment Overhead (b) Contracts with top-5 worst deployment overhead 
Fig. 9. Deployment overhead measured on all the 8,314 Ethereum mainnet contracts with at least one hundred transactions up to block 
number 4,200,000 (reached at the date Aug-24-2017). 
 
# 
Transaction hash on  
Ethereum mainnet 
Original gas 
/overhead 
1 0xda081509e17dcb852c4e12bc435be6d507
499993590e0da97aa0da4c1f3d915d 
22258/86.0% 
2 0xbf7a5b2113966a264dcd213d0e2a1d7d6
ce462c1f4f2059a81afe7f36be600f5 
32529/85.7% 
3 0x832d0282d84221ad21a3e8c43652653b6
6aea8bedfafc76c357e47da2c02314b 
20022/85.4% 
4 0xd8626e496a04c8a894094eeb848cf9502d
208834fd97bbcf4c86527c10e8555f 
26693/84.5% 
5 0x41000decd3cd39be9895e3c2a7250deb5
7c2e8e99a2f59534657d71df2c428de 
43357/76.7% 
   
(a) Distribution of the Runtime Overhead (b)  Transactions with top-5 worst runtime overhead 
Fig. 10. Runtime overhead measured on all the 19,944,547 transactions submitted to the 8,314 Ethereum mainnet contracts. 
58.1% 
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Figure 10 (a) shows the distribution of the runtime gas 
overhead in terms of gas increase. On average, the runtime 
overhead is 25.98% for the 8,314 instances and 17.5% for the 
985 distinctive ones. This is comparable to that of practical 
control flow anomaly based IDSs for conventional systems 
(e.g. the average execution time overhead of the work by 
Giffin and colleagues is 22% [19]). For a majority of the trans-
actions (94.5%), the runtime gas overhead is under 30%.  
The transactions with top-5 worst runtime overheads are 
shown in Fig. 10 (b). In the worst case, the runtime gas over-
head is 86.0%. We have performed a detailed analysis on the 
factors that affect the runtime overhead (presented in Section 
6.4). We found that the reason why the runtime gas overhead 
is so high for a small amount of the transactions is that they 
made an exceptionally high number of calls to external un-
protected contracts. When this happens, ContractGuard has 
to use the expensive contract storage to persist the calling con-
texts. At the moment, ContractGuard might be inapplicable 
to such contracts (under 5% among the 8,314 subject con-
tracts). We present more discussion on this issue in Section 6.5. 
5.2 Is It Practical to Handle False Alarms Manually? 
Besides overheads, another important issue that might af-
fect the practical use of ContractGuard is false alarms [32], 
which correspond to legitimate transactions that have been 
mistakenly classified as malicious. To avoid rejecting fu-
ture legitimate transactions, the administrators need to re-
view each alarm manually and append the path into the 
safe path set if it is a false alarm. This potentially involves 
significant manual effort.  
In order to investigate the amount of false alarms. We use 
the 8,314 real world contract accounts with at least one hun-
dred transactions. We assume that the developers deploy 
their contracts without training. Therefore, ContractGuard 
will have an empty safe path set initially. We further assume 
that all the transactions are legitimate, and the administrators 
will immediately add the context-tagged acyclic paths of a 
transaction to the safe path set when this transaction is re-
ported as a false alarm. Therefore, ContractGuard will not re-
port the following transactions with the same context-tagged 
acyclic paths as false alarms. Under these assumptions, we 
then count the amount of false alarms for each contract. Es-
sentially, this is an upper-bound estimation of the manual ef-
fort required to handle false alarms in the real world.  
Figure 11 (a) shows the distribution of false alarms, while 
Fig. 11 (b) shows contracts with top-5 most false alarms.  Un-
der the hypothesized scenario, ContractGuard reports 2.88 
false alarms on average for each contract. For a majority of the 
transactions (92.2%), the number of false alarms is under 5. 
This result lends support to the conjecture that the false alarm 
issue is manageable when we apply IDS to defend contracts. 
6 CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS 
We present the experimental evaluation of the effective-
ness of ContractGuard in this section. Three research ques-
tions will be evaluated: 
RQ1: Can ContractGuard effectively detect vulnerabilities? 
RQ2: What are the deployment overhead, runtime over-
head, and the amount of false alarms? 
RQ3: What are the factors that affect the deployment and 
runtime overheads? 
This section describes the experiment setup to evaluate our 
research questions and reports the experimental results. 
6.1 Experimental Subjects 
To investigate RQ1 and RQ2, we design two sets of exper-
iments. The first set of experiments (TABLE 2) uses six real-
life contract programs with reported vulnerabilities and at-
tack vectors. We choose these subjects because they repre-
sent famous attacks that have caused significant damage. 
For example, the first subject “DAO” is the original con-
tract from which hackers managed to steal tokens valued 
$60M and ultimately led to the hard-fork that created 
Ethereum Classic (ETC) [6]. And the second subject “Mul-
tisig” contains an exploit [7] that ultimately causes about 
$300M-worth cryptocurrency to be frozen and (probably) 
lost forever. The fourth contract subject “BecToken” is the 
one that was attacked by malicious attackers in April 2018, 
causing the token price to drop to nearly zero [28].    
The second set of experiments (TABLE 3) uses real-life con-
tract programs whose projects are open source and contain 
test cases written by developers in the Truffle framework. We 
choose these subjects because they are some of the most com-
plex dapp hosted on Github in term of code size.  We publish 
all the subjects, test cases, vulnerabilities, and their attack vec-
tors on our project website (https://github.com/contract-
guard/experiments). 
To investigate RQ3, we use the 8,314 contract instances 
from the Ethereum mainnet. Explanation of the experimental 
subjects can be found in Section 5.1. 
6.2 Empirical Study with Real-life Vulnerabilities 
For each of the six smart contract programs with a reported 
vulnerability and an attack vector (TABLE 2), we strictly 
follow the report to construct the attacking transaction. 
This attacking transaction is then mixed with 99 non-re-
verting normal transactions randomly chosen from the 
 
(a) False alarm count distribution 
# 
Contract Address on  
Ethereum mainnet 
False alarm  
count 
1 0x49516fe7bdc54b29a7f95ff55fdd38d9228e55af 60 
2 0x2faa316fc4624ec39adc2ef7b5301124cfb68777 59 
3 0xda4a4626d3e16e094de3225a751aab7128e96526 56 
4 0x3f593a15eb60672687c32492b62ed3e10e149ec6 53 
5 0xb2c818252457488728ca62affa8f320247b8a84a 53 
(b)  Contracts with top-5 most false alarm counts 
Fig. 11. Upper-bound Estimation of the False Alarm Counts. 
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Ethereum mainnet to create a test case as a sequence of 100 
transactions. The attacking transaction is put randomly at 
the last 10% positions of the sequence. To avoid bias, we 
repeat this process to create 100 test cases with different 
random normal transactions from the mainnet. The con-
tract creation transactions are separately achieved from the 
mainnet and shared among test cases.  
As we do not have the developer test suites for these pro-
grams, we omit training and start with an empty safe path set. 
We assume that all false alarms raised at the normal transac-
tions will be examined by the administrators, and these trans-
actions’ paths will be inserted into the safe path set immedi-
ately. Under this assumption, we apply ContractGuard to 
each program and execute them with the 100 test cases, and 
measure recall as the percentage of test cases in which Con-
tract successfully raises alarms at the attacking transactions. 
TABLE 2 shows the experiment results. For all of the pro-
grams, the recall is 100%. This shows how effectively Con-
tractGuard can defend against these known vulnerabilities. 
On the other hand, the runtime overhead, the deployment 
overhead, and false alarms are consistent with those observed 
on the 8,314 contract accounts on the mainnet (Section 5.1). As 
of August 30 2019, the average gas price is 1.468310-8 ETH, 
while the ETH price is $168.21 USD [39]. As shown in TABLE 
2, the maximum deployment and runtime overhead are 
59846.26 gas and 68371.95 gas, respectively. Therefore, if the 
administrators apply ContractGuard on these six real world 
contracts, at the most they need to pay an extra $0.1478 USD 
for each contract at deployment. And at the most the users 
need to pay an extra $0.1689USD for each transaction.  
6.3 Empirical Study with Seeded Vulnerabilities 
The programs in TABLE 3 come with open source project 
sites and test suites developed in the Truffle framework. 
These test suites are ideal candidates for training when we 
deploy ContractGuard to real-world contracts. These pro-
grams, though, do not have any reported vulnerabilities. 
To facilitate the experiment, we refer to the eleven major 
vulnerabilities in TABLE 1 and seed four of them: 
⚫ #3 arithmetic over-/under- flow: replacing Safe-
Math [44] calls with direct arithmetic operators. 
⚫ #4 default visibility: removing keyword “private”  
⚫ #6 unchecked send: removing the whole branch 
that check the return value of send and transfer. 
⚫ #11 logic error: replacing relational and logic op-
erators. 
Seeding the remaining seven types of vulnerabilities is dif-
ficult either because they are not directly related to the con-
tract code (#5, #7, #10), or because these programs do not 
have the related program structures that enable seeding (#1, 
#2, #8, #9). Note that #1, #2, #8 have already been covered in 
the first experiment. 
For each program, we create all possible seeded versions. 
The total number and those for the four vulnerabilities are 
shown in the “total seeded” column of TABLE 3. We then ex-
ecute the developer test suite on each seeded version. Ver-
sions that fail the test suite are discarded. Next, we create a 
test case by randomly draw 100 transactions from both the 
mainnet and a test pool we manually construct to trigger the 
attack on the seeded vulnerability, and then execute the test 
case with both the original program and the seeded version. 
If their contract storage values are different after executing a 
transaction, then we add this version into the subject seeded 
version set and mark this transaction as the attacking transac-
tion. This process is repeated until we have 100 test cases for 
each subject seeded version. We use these subject seeded ver-
sions to simulate vulnerabilities that the developer test case 
fail to detect, but can be exploited by hackers after deploy-
ment.  Their total number and those for the four vulnerabili-
ties are reported in the “subject seeded” column of TABLE 3. 
For each subject seeded version, we apply ContractGuard 
on them and use the developer test suite for training. We then 
execute the 100 test cases for this version, and measure the re-
call of this version as the percentage of test cases in which 
Contract successfully raises alarms and reverts at the simu-
lated attacking transactions. As there are multiple seeded ver-
sions, we report the average recall for each program. 
TABLE 3 shows the experiment results. The average recall 
TABLE 2 
EXPERIMENTS WITH REAL-LIFE REPORTED VULNERABILITIES AND ATTACK VECTORS 
Program 
Vulnerability and  
reported attack vector 
Code Size 
(bytes) 
Deployment Overhead Runtime Overhead Recall 
avg. 
False alarms 
avg. % avg. gas % avg. gas 
DAO Reentrancy [33] 1774 11.95% 35751.43 20.51% 43845.47 100% 4.48 
MultiSig Dangerous Delegatecall [34] 764 29.58% 22679.66 28.27% 29085.6 100% 2.0 
KoETH Unchecked send [35] 3617 31.18% 37359.64 23.82% 44067.72 100% 13.57 
BecToken Arithmetic overflow [36] 5963 9.52% 59846.26 15.75% 68371.95 100% 8.2 
OwlWallet Tx.Origin Authentication [37] 561 27.27% 25032.01 26.50% 31456.74 100% 3.0 
MerdeToken Arithmetic underflow [38] 1013 21.03% 35990.97 18.74% 42397.30 100% 4.0 
TABLE 3 
EXPERIMENTS WITH REAL-LIFE DEVELOPER TEST CASES AND SEEDED VULNERABILITIES 
Program and  
project site 
Code Size 
(bytes) 
Truffle test 
cases† 
Total seeded 
Vulnerabilities 
Subject seeded 
Vulnerabilities 
Deployment 
overhead % 
Runtime  
overhead % 
Recall 
avg. 
False alarms 
avg. 
Cryptokitties [40] 30966 516 64(14,7,3,40) 5(2,1,0,2) 14.28% 9.03% 60.0% 1.5 
StatusNetwork [41] 38631 261 83(28,9,6,40) 2(0,1,1,0) 19.02% 15.79% 100% 3.0 
VotingDapp [42] 2326 14 15(6,2,0,7) 2(2,0,0,0) 12.33% 10.84% 100% 1.0 
pool-shark [43] 5895 69 33(8,6,1,18) 3(2,1,0,0) 10.23% 31.52% 100% 5.9 
† The number of test cases is measured by the total number of transactions sent to the contracts when executing the complete Truffle test suite.  
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is 83.3% for all subject seeded versions of all programs. We 
examine the missed cases and find that all of the versions that 
ContractGuard misses are seeded with logic errors. The rea-
son why ContractGuard fails to prevent them is because of 
coincidental correctness: there exists some developer test 
cases which execute the same path as the attacking transac-
tion, but did not trigger the failure. As the paths of the attack-
ing transactions are in the safe path set, ContractGuard fails 
to detect them. 
6.4 Factors that Affect Overheads 
In order to investigate the factors that might affect the 
overhead, we decompose the implementation of Contract-
Guard into various instrument points (IP), each of which 
represents a point in the original code to insert instru-
mented code. Due to the lack of space, we leave the de-
tailed implementation in the supplementary material.   
TABLE 4 shows the deployment/runtime gas cost of each 
individual instrument point. The deployment cost is simply 
the byte size of instrumented code multiplied by 200. The 
highest cost comes from the contract wrapper instrumented 
at the beginning of every contract. This is the reason why 
smaller contacts tend to have higher deployment overhead.  
The runtime cost is calculated with the gas model of EVM 
[18]. As we can see, besides the upfront cost of contract wrap-
per, the most costly factor is the external call to unprotected 
contract. The high cost is due to the fact that we need to persist  
ctx into the contract storage: a single SSET instruction that 
rewrite a 256-bit word in the storage already cost 5000 gas. 
This is the trade-off we need to make in order to detect the 
reentrant control flow paths. Note that external call to pro-
tected contract is significantly cheaper, because in this case 
ctx can be passed inside the message call data without the 
need of expensive writing to contract storage.  
6.5 Discussions 
We now discuss several issues that arise in the experiments. 
1. At the moment, ContractGuard might not be very effec-
tive at defending against logic error in a complex predicate 
due to coincidental correctness.  As one of the main causes of 
coincidental correctness is short-circuiting, we conjecture that 
by adding virtual branches that evaluate every short-circuited 
condition, the effectiveness of ContractGuard can be im-
proved. We plan to explore more on this issue in the future.  
2.  The high cost of external call to unprotected contracts 
prevent the practical application of ContractGuard to smart 
contract programs with an abundance of this feature. While 
this seems a limitation, we shall note that making an external 
call to unfamiliar contracts is a dangerous practice and highly 
discouraged [26]. On the other hand, ContractGuard does not 
introduce high cost when the contract makes an external call 
to protected contracts within the same program, which is a 
common practice in multi-contracts programs.  
3. Although we haven’t found any such cases among exist-
ing Ethereum mainnet contracts, it is still possible that the size 
of a contract exceeds the 24576 bytes hard limit when it is in-
strumented by ContractGuard. When this happens, the most 
probable cause might be that the initial safe path set is too 
large to be embedded into the code as a list or MPHT.  In this 
case, ContractGuard will resort to using built-in mapping in 
contract storage to store some of the paths. This will signifi-
cantly increase the deployment overhead, as the administra-
tors need to pay for extra expensive transactions to write into 
the built-in mapping (20000 gas for each path). However, this 
will not increase the runtime overhead, because each set 
membership test always contain a visit to the built-in map-
ping for checking against dynamically added paths, and this 
visit costs constant gas regardless of the size of the mapping. 
7 RELATED WORK 
7.1 Smart Contract Analysis and Verification 
In the literature, a number of tools have been proposed to 
verify smart contracts. They can be classified according to 
the underlying techniques. Some of them rely on program 
analysis to find vulnerabilities. For example, tools includ-
ing Oyente [45], Teether [4], Gasper [5] and the recent work 
by Grossman et al. [46] use symbolic execution to explore 
whether there exists paths that can trigger any known vul-
nerability. ContractFuzzer [11] uses random fuzzing to 
find potential attack vectors. Other works rely on formal 
verification and theorem proving. For example, Zeus [6] 
uses abstract interpretation and constrained horn clauses, 
MadMax [10] uses Datalog theorem prover, and the work 
by Grishchenko et al. [47] uses the F* theorem prover.  
Grishchenko et al. [47] uses the F* theorem prover.  
Although these tools can detect candidates of vulnerabili-
ties, the use of them alone may not adequately protect the ex-
ecution of smart contract programs. Most of these tools are 
designed to deal with specific known vulnerabilities. Their 
protection against unknown vulnerabilities is uncertain. In 
contrast, vulnerabilities detected by ContractGuard based on 
control flow anomaly is not limited to a specific known pat-
tern. It can defend against unknown vulnerabilities as long as 
they trigger a control flow path not observed in training. Be-
sides, as a tool for use after deployment, ContractGuard com-
plements existing verification tools for use before deployment.  
7.2 Execution Profiling 
Control flow profiling is a fundamental dynamic analysis 
technique with many applications. Since the seminal EPP 
algorithm was proposed [21], many works have tried to 
improve EPP either by adding more control flow infor-
mation, or by further reducing the overhead. For example, 
whole program path (WPP) profiling [48] compresses the 
full sequence of intra-procedural acyclic paths to profile 
TABLE 4 
OVERHEAD OF VARIOUS INSTRUMENT POINTS (IPS) 
Instrument point 
Deployment  
gas cost 
Runtime 
gas cost 
Contract wrapper 16000 500~5980 
Function entry 4200 45 
Branch 2600 30 
Backedge 5200 57 
Internal call-edge 4400 48 
Internal return-edge 6200 68 
External call to unprotected contract 5000 5348 
External call to protected contract 6800 70 
Function exit 800 9 
Path set checking†  1600*n + 2800 378 
†: n is the size of the initial safe path set 
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the complete control flow path. Interprocedural path pro-
filing [49] tries to achieve the same goal by extending EPP 
to the system control flow graph. Both works are too ex-
pensive to apply to Ethereum smart contracts in term of 
runtime overhead. The recent work by D'Elia and Deme-
trescu [50] improves EPP by extending the acyclic path seg-
ments across multiple loop iterations. Although the 
runtime overhead is comparable to EPP, this improvement 
might dramatically increases the path numbers for func-
tions with nested loops. This is particularly undesirable in 
our scenario, as the path set size will inflate, adding to the 
deployment cost. Besides path profiling, there are also re-
search on calling context profiling. For example, a recent 
work by Sumner and colleagues [51] utilize stack depth to 
optimize the profiling cost. The stack depth information, 
however, is not available in EVM.  
Besides control flows, other aspects of execution can be 
profiled, such as data flows [52] or dynamic invariants [53]. 
The study of their usefulness to protect smart contract pro-
grams is left as future work. 
7.3 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
Conventional IDSs can be classified as signature-based or 
anomaly-based [19]. Signature-based IDSs (e.g. [54], [55]) try 
to identify known patterns of intrusions with pre-identified 
intrusion signatures, while anomaly-based IDSs (e.g. [15], [16], 
[19]) assumes the nature of the intrusion is unknown, but will 
deviate from the program’s normal behaviors profiled from 
training. Signature-based IDSs in general are more precise, as 
they can utilize vulnerability-specific properties to detect at-
tacks. However, they only work on known vulnerabilities. 
Furthermore, though not a major concern for conventional 
systems, the signature database might be too large for IDS to 
store them in the contracts. These are the reasons why Con-
tractGuard follows the anomaly-based approach instead. 
Existing anomaly-based IDSs use different models to de-
fine the behavior of the protected systems. There are two 
main dimensions to the model. The first dimension is the pro-
file execution information. Examples include system calls [19], 
call stacks [16], input data/network packets [19], and jump 
sequence [16]. The second dimension is how the execution in-
formation is abstracted into a model.  Besides the simple se-
quence model, other more sophisticated models have been 
proposed, such as the Dyck model [19], the n-jump sliding 
window model [15], and the waypoints model [16]. Contract-
Guard adds to this line of research with the new context-
tagged acyclic path model designed to meet the stringent re-
quirements of protecting Ethereum smart contract programs. 
8 CONCLUSIONS 
From the perspective of administrators, Ethereum smart 
contract programs are vulnerable for attacks after deploy-
ment. Once a contract has been deployed, anyone from an-
ywhere can anonymously inspect its implementation and 
current contract states, at any time. Once a vulnerability is 
found, the hackers can immediately make an intrusion at-
tack as long as they have enough ethers. The damage thus 
made will be irreversible once it has been accepted into the 
main chain. There is no further chance to fix the mistake! 
In this work, our goal is to address this undesirable situa-
tion and provide a second chance to the administrators. We 
propose ContractGuard, which is the first IDS for Ethereum 
smart contracts. By applying ContractGuard on real world 
Ethereum mainnet contracts, real world vulnerabilities, and 
seeded vulnerabilities, we show that ContractGuard is effec-
tive at defending vulnerabilities with low deployment and 
runtime overheads. 
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